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of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Per-capita output differs widely across countries, with dif-
ferences of a factor of 20 not uncommon. These economic
statistics reﬂect substantial differences in the economic
well-being of people. While factors like luck and geo-
graphic location, factors beyond a country’s control, cer-
tainly account for some of this inequality, many think
much is also due to some countries following good eco-
nomic policies and others bad. That is why economists
have extensively studied the policies of countries under-
going the development process (for example, Harberger
1984, Krueger 1987, Young 1992). If economic policy is
a major determinant of the wealth of nations, then the
potential beneﬁts of learning which policies work, and
which do not, are obviously immense.
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The task of determining the impact of any particular
policy on the wealth of a nation is extremely difficult. But
some recent, important developments havemoved us clos-
er to being able to tackle such tasks. One is the signiﬁcant
expansion in the quantity and type of data available to
economists. A primary contribution has come from Sum-
mers and Heston (1991), who have compiled observations
on per-capita output (and other variables) for most of the
countries in the world, for most of the post–World War II
period. Their construction of per-capita output uses a com-
mon set of prices to value the quantities of ﬁnal goods
and services for each country. Good economic statistics
are, of course, necessary for any work attempting to un-
derstand the impact of economic policies. Another devel-
opment is the supplementing of these data on per-capita
output, by many researchers, with country-speciﬁc mea-
sures of such things as the stock of physical capital, the
stock of education and health, and the type of political
system. With these data, researchers have been looking for
variables that are correlated with the wealth of nations.
While all of this is important, economists are also well
aware of the limitations of basing policy advice solely on
data analysis, on correlations among economic variables.
The reasons are well known and include at least these:
Finding a correlation between two variables does not
prove a causation; and even if one were very conﬁdent
that changes in one variable (say, the stock of education
in a nation) caused changes in another (say, the wealth of
a nation) in some historical period, that relationship may
not continue to hold if new policies are introduced. Data
analysis is simply not enough.
Because of these limitations of data analysis, econo-
mists have also been exploring theories that might help in
policy evaluation. Ultimately, the goal is for theory to pro-
vide answers to questions such as, What is the impact of
increasing investment in education? Of privatization? Of
opening borders to trade? But where should we begin? A
natural initial goal is to build models which can replicate
the economic statistics of actual economies (for example,
the range of per-capita output in the world). This is what
Lucas (1988, p. 3) has in mind in his 1985 Marshall lec-
ture when he deﬁnes the “problem of economic develop-
ment” to be the “problem of accounting for the observed
pattern, across countries and across time, in levels and
rates of growth of per capita income.” With this as the
goal, there is a natural way to compare competing theo-
ries: choose model A rather than model B to analyze pol-
icy if model A mimics more features of actual economies.
(See Lucas 1980 for a discussion of this methodological
view.)
The purpose of this article is to provide a progress re-
port on research on the “problem of economic develop-
ment.” I will describe here some of the recent efforts to
buildmodelsthatproduceeconomicstatisticswhichmatch
the observed patterns across countries in per-capita output.
I call these patterns development facts and the models the-
ories of economic development.
While the model building is at an early stage, so that
its relevance for policy is limited at this point, I think prog-
ress has been made. In fact, my hunch is that, ultimately,
solutions to the development problem could come from
those theories that focus on differences across countries in
the incentives provided to entrepreneurs to create busi-
nesses, adopt technologies, and the like (such as in Parente
and Prescott 1991). Admittedly, this hunch may reﬂect my
personal biases, since my own work is in related areas.
Still, my view is based in part on the successes of the en-
trepreneurial approach in explaining development facts
and on the failures of two other types of theories in doing
so: the neoclassical theory of economic growth, which re-
lies on differences in physical capital per person across
countries to explain the wide diversity in per-capita out-
put, and the newer theories of economic development
(such as in Lucas 1988 and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil
1992), which stress differences in human capital, or edu-
cation, across countries.
If the entrepreneurial approach continues to be success-
ful, then the policy implications are somewhat sobering.
For if the problem of economic development were, for ex-
ample, primarily a matter of too little education in poor
countries, then the obvious solution would be for the inter-
national community to simply subsidize schooling where
it is lacking. But if the problem is instead barriers placed
in the way of entrepreneurs, then the solution is much less
obvious. Barriers to entrepreneurs are created by groups in
society, those with vested interests in the status quo. Much
must be learned about the forces that lead to such barriers
if economists are to be able to offer policy advice about
how to design institutions that minimize this behavior.
Some Development Facts
Since the goal of development theory (as deﬁned by Lucas
1988) is to explain the development facts, a key question
is, What facts? A good source of some basic facts about
the distribution of wealth across nations is the article by
Parente and Prescott (in this issue). Their analysis is based
on data on most of the countries in the Summers and
Heston data set over the period 1960–85. Some of their
principal ﬁndings are these four development facts:
1.There is a huge disparity in wealth across nations
each year. According to Parente and Prescott, for ex-
ample, in 1985 the average per-capita output of the
ﬁve countries with the highest per-capita output was
29 times the average per-capita output of the ﬁve
lowest-output countries.
2.The range of the distribution of relative wealth has
been roughly constant over this period, where rela-
tive wealth is measured relative to the industrial
leader, the United States.
3.Several countries have made large moves in the rela-
tive wealth distribution—some up (Japan, for exam-
ple) and some down (Zambia, for example).4.While the range of relative wealth has not changed
much, the distribution of the level of wealth has
shifted up over time; that is, wealth has grown.
Besides Parente and Prescott (in this issue), many oth-
ers haveanalyzed the Summersand Heston dataset. Many
of these studies supplement the data with country-speciﬁc
measures of things like education (Barro 1991, 1992;
Benhabib and Spiegel 1992; Mankiw, Romer, and Weil
1992), equipment investment (De Long and Summers
1991), trade (Backus, Kehoe, and Kehoe 1992), and the
type of political system.
2 What these studies do, in effect,
is break the sample of Summers and Heston countries into
groups (deﬁned by things like level of education) and
examine the distribution of wealth within those subgroups.
Typically the studies examine the mean of the distribution
of wealth or the mean growth rate in each subgroup.
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In considering how well a model matches the devel-
opment facts, I focus attention here on the four Parente-
Prescott ﬁndings listed above. Ultimately, of course, the
ﬁndings of the other studies (as well as the other ﬁndings
of Parente and Prescott) must be used in building theories
of economic development. But initially, attention must be
limited to some extent in order to make progress.
Two ﬁnal points about data. First, while a good theory
must be consistent with the facts, it does not necessarily
have to explain, or help us understand, all of them. For
example, the neoclassical growth model does not explain
productivity growth, but it does help us understand other
features of the data, such as the relative constancy of real
interest rates and the growth in the real wage. In the same
way, a good theory of development might explain only a
subset of facts: The particular facts depend on the ques-
tions being asked.
For example, the fact that the range of relative per-
capita output has not changed much (fact 2) suggests that
whatever causes growth (fact 4)—that is, the distribution
of wealth to shift up—has beneﬁts for all countries. There
appear to be common factors that bind countries together.
Hence, those advising developing countries might be hap-
py with a model that explains why there is such large dis-
parity in the wealth of nations (fact 1), or what causes
large moves (up and down) in the relative wealth distribu-
tion (fact 3). This would be true even if the model does
not explain what causes the distribution of wealth to shift
up (though the model should at least be consistent with
this fact).
But someone advising the G-7 countries (a group of
seven highly developed countries) wants a theory that ex-
plains growth. After all, these few countries are mainly re-
sponsible for determining the rate at which the distribution
of wealth shifts up, through their research and develop-
ment policies, support for academic science, and the like.
Indeed, most development theories to date have primarily
focused on understanding growth. (See, for example,
Romer 1986, 1990; Jones and Manuelli 1990; Grossman
and Helpman 1991; and Rebelo 1991.) This literature has
been extensively reviewed elsewhere. (See, for example,
Helpman 1992.) In this article, I discuss models that have
primarily focused on the other three development facts.
Second, while I use the term facts for the above ﬁnd-
ings, keep in mind that, among other things, the data for
some countries are still of poor quality, and the time peri-
od for which the data are available for most countries is
rather short. The practical signiﬁcance of this is that one
should be less conﬁdent in abandoning model A in favor
of model B based on model A’s inability to match some
aspect of the data.
Overview
Since my formal analysis begins with a rather long section
that sets up a consistent notation, here I provide a brief
guide to the entire article.
Addressing the development facts obviously requires a
model with more than one country and, hence, also as-
sumptions about how these countries interact. Below I will
study both of the polar assumptions about trade: complete
factor mobility and immobility.
I will start by reviewing the neoclassical model of eco-
nomic growth ﬁrst developed by Solow in 1956. I will
review it generally and then as a theory of economic de-
velopment.
4 This model has been the workhorse in many
areas in economics—in the analysis of tax policy in public
ﬁnance, for example. (See Prescott 1988 for a discussion
of the model’s impact.) Because of the model’s wide suc-
cess, it is a prime candidate for a theory of economic de-
velopment. The Solow model includes a production func-
tion that has constant returns-to-scale in two inputs, physi-
cal capital and homogeneous labor. To use the model as
a theory of economic development, I begin by assuming
that there are many countries, that ﬁrms in each country
have access to the same production technology, and that
there is factor mobility. Then capital is allocated so that
the marginal product of capital is equal across countries.
This means that the capital-to-labor ratio and per-capita
output are the same in every country. This, of course, is
grossly at odds with development fact 1.
I will study several changes to the Solow model that
break this equal-output implication. Most of these, how-
ever, do not seem likely to change the general conclusion
that the model cannot account for great inequality (fact 1).
For example, I will derive a simple formula which ex-
presses (in a world of capital mobility) the relative output
of two countries as a function of their taxes on capital
rental payments. I will use it to show that large differences
in taxes on capital rental payments across countries are
associated with small differences in per-capita output (as
compared to fact 1).
A more promising change that Lucas (1988) considers
is to modify the form of the production function. In con-
sidering this change, one is guided by a key question:
How can the production function be altered so that the
equalization of the marginal products of physical capital
across countries (implied by trade) no longer means that
the quantity of physical capital per person (and output per
person) is also identical? In other words, why is the mar-
ginal product of capital not high in countries where it is
scarce? The answer Lucas (1988) proposes is that other
inputs are also scarce in such countries, in particular, capi-
tal inputs complementary to physical capital. Since these
other capital inputs are missing from the Solow model, I
refer to them as missing capital.
What is this missing capital? Lucas (1988) takes it to
be human capital, by which he means the general skill
level of the representative worker. Many others have fol-
lowed this lead. Under this interpretation of missing capi-
tal, physical capital is not attracted to less-developed coun-
tries where it is scarce because they lack a skilled work
force to do things like operate machines.Doubts have subsequently been raised about whether
human capital will play an important role in explaining
the development facts, at least when this type of capital is
thought of as years of schooling. I will present some addi-
tional doubts below.
These doubts about human capital have led to other
candidates for missing capital. One candidate is closely as-
sociated with the policies of deregulation and privatization
that are often recommended by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These policies are im-
plicitly based on the assumption that they will create in-
centives for entrepreneurs to create new businesses, adopt
new technologies, and the like. Such investments by entre-
preneurs create a type of capital, capital that exists inde-
pendently of the entrepreneur. This capital has been given
several names: goodwill or intangible capital by accoun-
tants and organizational capital by economists (Prescott
and Visscher 1980), for example. It has recently been in-
troduced in a development context by Parente and Prescott
(1991), who use the term ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital. Holmes
and I (1992) call it business capital, the term I will use
here. Under this interpretation of missing capital, physical
capital is not attracted to less-developed countries where
it is scarce because entrepreneurs have created very few
opportunities in which to invest physical capital (an idea
Schultz 1974 emphasizes).
Below I will consider two modiﬁcations of the Solow
model—one adding human capital, the other adding busi-
ness capital—and evaluate each as a theory of develop-
ment.
A model that extends the Solow model by introducing
human capital will be presented ﬁrst. The model includes
a production technology that exhibits constant returns-to-
scale in two capital inputs, physical and human capital,
while the accumulation technologies for each capital good
also display constant returns. The model is a version of
that Lucas (1988) discusses.
5 The model is consistent with
wide differences in per-capita output—that is, fact 1—un-
der all trade assumptions. Other implications of the theory,
however, seem to be at odds with the facts. As Parente
and Prescott (1991) argue, and as will be shown below, if
there are small differences among countries, then the
range of relative output in the model economy increases
through time (even in a world with trade), thus contradict-
ing fact 2.
6 Lucas (1993) discusses other troubling aspects
of the formulation.
A model that extends the Solow model by introducing
business capital will be presented next, a version of that
of Parente and Prescott (1991). In the model, the produc-
tion technology facing an entrepreneur exhibits increasing
and then decreasing returns-to-scale in three inputs: two
capital inputs, physical and business capital, and homoge-
neous labor. This leads to a unique business size. Regard-
ingtheaccumulationtechnologyforbusinesscapital,some
literature suggests that this technology does not display
constant returns. Rather, the return to investment in busi-
ness capital, and to adopting new technology, in a country
depends on how far the country’s business capital is be-
hind world technology standards. The further behind it is,
the greater is its return to investment. The curvature pa-
rameter of this accumulation technology is a key parame-
ter in the model. It is chosen so that the model is able to
replicate the post-WWII experience of Japan, that is, so
that it can produce large moves in the relative wealth dis-
tribution (consistent with fact 3).
In a steady state of the model, all countries grow at the
same rate (a rate determined by the rate at which world
technology expands). Hence, the range of relative output
is constant through time (fact 2), as in the Solow model.
I derive a new formula for this model which expresses (in
a world of capital mobility) the relative output of two
countries as a function of their taxes on physical and busi-
ness capital rental payments. This formula is an analog to
that calculated in the Solow model. As a simple example
will show, differences in tax rates on payments to capital
(of both types) lead to much larger differences in per-
capita output than in the Solow model. Still, questions re-
main about whether the range of taxes necessary to ex-
plain fact 1 is believable and, more generally, how to mea-
sure effective tax rates on entrepreneurs in these countries.
Neoclassical Growth Theory
The Solow Model...
Here I develop a version of the Solow (1956) growth
model, as extended by Cass (1965) to include endogenous
savings. This is done so that I can then assess the model
as a theory of development.
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The model is a closed economy. Time is discrete; t =
0,1,2,.... At each time t,the economy produces one good,
the time t good, that can be consumed or converted into
units of investment. The economy is comprised of N iden-
tical, inﬁnitely lived households, each endowed with a
unit of time each period. For simplicity, leisure is ignored.
The time endowment is therefore inelastically supplied
each time period.
Let ct denote per-person consumption of the time t
good. (Per-capita quantities are denoted by lowercase let-
ters; total quantities, by uppercase letters.) Then a repre-







where the discount factor bÎ(0,1) and the utility func-
tion u(·) is increasing and concave.
Let Yt denote economywide output of the time t good.
Then aggregate production is
(2) Yt = F(Kt,Nt,At)
where Kt is the economy’s total number of units of cap-
ital, Nt = N is its total time endowment, At is its level of
technology, and the production function F(·,·,At)i si n -
creasing, concave, and homogeneous of degree one in the
ﬁrst two arguments. Again, output can either be con-
sumed, Ct, or invested, Xt, so that Yt = Ct + Xt. The law
of motion for capital is Kt+1 = (1−d)Kt + Xt, where d >0
istherateofcapitaldepreciation.Togethertheseimplythat
(3) Yt = Ct + Kt+1 − (1−d)Kt.
The level of technology is assumed to follow
(4) At+1 = (1+µ)At
whereµ>0i st h erate of technological change. Equations
(1)–(4), together with the initial condition (K0,A0), de-
scribe the economy’s preferences, technology, and endow-
ments.The resource allocation problem facing this economy
is simple to describe. At time t = 0, the economy inherits
a capital stock K0. This capital stock, the current level of
technology A0, and the time endowment N determine a
level of output Y0. A choice must be made as to what cap-
ital stock K1 to carry forward into time period 1. This is
equivalent to choosing investment X0 (from the law of
motion for capital) and, hence, also consumption C0.A s
the economy enters time period 1, it inherits the capital
stock K1 determined by choices at time 0. This capital,
together with A1 and N, determine output Y1, and the
choices are repeated. These choices can be made in a
number of ways—for example, by command through a
central planner or, as examined below, through a market.
Market Allocation
For the market allocation studied here, there are three
types of actors: households, ﬁrms, and banks. Households
own the ﬁrms and banks (though, by assumption, these
make zero proﬁts). Households supply labor to ﬁrms in
return for wages and then use the wages to purchase con-
sumption goods from the ﬁrms. Any excess of wages over
consumption purchases is deposited at banks where it
earns interest. Firms rent labor input from the households
and capital input from the banks. They sell consumption
goods to households and investment goods to banks.
Banks own the capital stock. They take deposits from
households and use the deposits to purchase investment
goods from ﬁrms to increase their capital holdings. Banks
rent the capital to ﬁrms, using the proceeds to pay off in-
terest on deposits.
Next I will describe the decision problems of these ac-
tors. (Since, given assumptions below, the numbers of
ﬁrms and banks are indeterminate, assume that the num-
bers of ﬁrms and banks equal the number of households.
In this way, the same notation can be used to denote per-
capita, per-ﬁrm, and per-bank quantities.)
Households face the following prices: wt, the rental
rate for a unit of labor, denominated in units of the time
t good, and it, the interest rate on deposits, with each unit
of the time t good deposited at the bank yielding 1 + it
units of the time t + 1 good. Let nt be the time devoted to
work and dt be the deposits made in the bank at time t.
Then the budget constraint of the representative household
at time t is
(5) ct + dt = dt−1(1+it−1)+w tn t.
Terms on the right side of constraint (5) are the sources of
income. Wage income is wtnt, and dt−1(1+it−1) is the in-
come from deposits made at time t −1 . 8Terms on the left
side of constraint (5) are the uses of income. Income can
either be consumed, ct, or deposited in the bank, dt. If
households maximize utility, it must be true that
(6) u¢(ct)=b [ u ¢ ( c t +1)](1+it)
where u¢(ct) is the derivative of u(·). If a household is
maximizing utility, then the cost of postponing a unit of
consumption—the left side of (6)—must equal the beneﬁt
of doing so—the right side of (6).
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Since ﬁrms rent both labor and capital, a ﬁrm faces a
sequence of static maximization problems. The rental rate
on a unit of capital is denoted rt, denominated in units of





(8) ct + xt £ F(kt,nt,At).
If a ﬁrm is maximizing proﬁts, then it must be that
(9) rt = MPKt(kt,nt,At)
(10) wt = MPLt(kt,nt,At)
(11) ct + xt = F(kt,nt,At)
where MPKt = F1(·,nt,At) and MPLt = F2(kt,·,At) denote
the marginal products of capital and labor and where Fi is
the partial derivative of F with respect to its ith argument.
Consider next the operation of a representative bank.
Suppose at the end of a time period, say time t −1 ,t h e
bank takes a deposit of a time t − 1 good from a house-
hold. With the deposit, the bank purchases a unit of in-
vestment. Receipts from this operation are zero. At time
t, the bank rents the capital to a ﬁrm for rt units of the
time t good; after its use, the capital is worth 1 − d units
of the time t good. For the deposit taken at the end of
time t − 1, the bank owes 1 + it−1 units of the time t good.
Receipts from this operation are
(12) [rt + (1−d)] − (1+it−1).
Assume that receipts per unit of deposit are independent
of the volume of deposits; that is, assume constant returns-
to-scale in intermediation.
Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium for this economy consists of
• An allocation for households {ct,dt,nt}
• An allocation for ﬁrms {ct,kt,xt,nt}
• An allocation for banks {dt,kt,xt}
• A price system {rt,it,wt}
such that
a. Households maximize utility subject to
their budget constraints.
b. Firms maximize proﬁts subject to
their technology constraints.
c. Banks maximize proﬁts subject to
their technology constraints.
d. Markets clear.
e. The net worth of banks is zero.
A steady-state competitive equilibrium is a competitive
equilibrium in which each variable either is constant or
grows at a constant rate.
I am primarily interested in examining conditions that
are necessary for equilibrium. Part a of the competitive
equilibrium deﬁnition implies that (6) is a necessary con-
dition; part b, that (9)–(11) are. To satisfy part c, banks
must earn zero proﬁts on each transaction, or
(13) rt = it−1 + d.Functional Forms and Parameters
To be able to assess the Solow model as a theory of eco-
nomic development in the sense above, we must make
choices for functional forms and assign values to parame-
ters. Such decisions have been made by researchers using
the model to study U.S. time series data. In particular,
choices have been made so that quantities and prices in
the steady-state competitive equilibrium of the model—
such as productivity growth, the capital/output ratio, cap-
ital’s share in income, and interest rates—closely match
the corresponding observed time series averages for the
United States. These issues have been extensively dis-
cussed elsewhere (Prescott 1986, Lucas 1988, Christiano
1989 and the references there), so here I simply present
the choices that have been made.
Theproductionfunction,equation(2),istypicallytaken
to have a Cobb-Douglas form:




With this technology, the parameter q is equal to capital’s
share of income, that is, rtKt/Yt. This parameter can be de-
termined from the national income and product accounts
(the NIPA). Capital’s share of income differs across stud-
ies depending on how one treats, for example, the services
of consumer durables. If these are included in capital ser-
vices, capital’s income share is 36 percent, or 0.36 (Pres-
cott 1986). The depreciation parameter d can also be mea-
sured using the NIPA. A typical value is 10 percent, or
0.10.
Another key parameter is the rate of exogenous tech-
nological change, µ. This parameter cannot be measured
directly. However, the requirement that the model’s pro-
ductivity growth match historical averages is sufficient to
determine a value for µ. This can be shown in a few steps:
ﬁrst, note that condition (9) becomes










where yt = Atk
q
t is per-capita output.
11 Second, as argued
below, rt is constant in a steady-state competitive equilib-
rium, so condition (15) implies that yt and kt grow at the
same rate, say, g. This means that in a steady state, yt and
kt can be expressed as yt = ys(1+g)
t and kt = ks(1+g)
t. Sub-
stituting these into the per-capita production function, and
rearranging, gives the growth rate of productivity:
(16) g = (1+µ)
1/(1−q) −1 .
With annual productivity growth about 2 percent (g =
0.02) and with capital’s income share 36 percent (q =
0.36), the rate of technological change per year is about
1.3 percent (µ = 0.013).
The utility function is typically chosen to be




In a steady state, since yt and kt grow at the rate g,w ec a n
easily verify that ct = cs(1+g)
t; examine equation (3). Us-
ing this fact, and this utility function, we can rewrite the
steady-state condition for (6) as
(18) (1+g)
s/b =1+i t.
This means that it is constant in the steady state; hence,
from (13), rt is too (as claimed above). The studies Pres-
cott (1988) cites indicate that s is close to one; other argu-
ments suggest a choice for b of about 0.96.
...A saTheory of Development
Can the Solow model account for signiﬁcant differences
in per-capita output across countries? To answer this ques-
tion, consider a world with many economies like the one
sketched above. (Call them countries.) Let i index coun-
tries, and deﬁne Kit and Yit to be the capital used in coun-
try i at time t and the output produced in country i at time
t. Note that Kit is the capital used at time t,but not neces-
sarily that owned by the residents of country i; also, Yit is
the output produced in country i, but not necessarily its
income. Begin with the assumption that countries have the
same values for (b,s,q,d) and the same technology At, but
may differ in their initial endowments of labor Ni and cap-
ital Ki0.
A deﬁnition of competitive equilibrium in a world with
many countries is much the same as that in the closed
economy. All that is needed is more notation. Allocations
must now specify country. For example, an allocation for
households is denoted {cit,dijt,nit}, where cit is the con-
sumption per person in country i at time t,dijt are the de-
posits made by country i households in country j banks at
time t, and nit is the labor supply in country i at time t.
Prices must also be indexed by countries. Now the price
system is given by {rjt,ijt,wjt}, where rjt is the rental rate
on a unit of capital in country j at time t,ijt is the rate on
deposits in country j at t,and wjt is the wage in country j
at t.
Necessary conditions for a competitive equilibrium in
the world economy include the conditions derived above,
but now one for each country. [That is, index by i each
quantity and price in (6), (9)–(11), and (13).] Additional
necessary conditions are derived from the assumptions
made about trade across countries. Take as a starting point
the following possibilitiesfor trade. Free movement across
borders is allowed capital, both physical capital and de-
posits, but not households. Banks from country j can take
deposits from citizens of any country and rent physical
capital to ﬁrms in any country. Since the market for de-
posits is worldwide, in a competitive equilibrium banks
with deposits will pay a common interest rate it; that is, a
necessary condition is that iit = ijt.
12 Therefore, the neces-
sary condition (6) for country i can be simpliﬁed by in-
dexing only consumption by i. Similarly, in a world of
physical capital mobility, the rental rate rt will be the
same in all countries in which capital is employed; that is,
a necessary condition is that rit = rjt.
13 Therefore, the nec-
essary condition (9) for country i can be simpliﬁed by in-
dexing only the marginal product by i. Now the ratio of
(9) for two countries will be
(19) rit/rjt = rt/rt =1=[ MPKit(kit)]/[MPKjt(kjt)]
=( q A tk it
q−1)/(qAtkjt
q−1).
Marginal products of capital are equal across countries, so
capital/labor ratios kit are too. Since output per person
equals yit = At(kit)
q, yit is the same across countries. Clear-
ly, the Solow model, in which all countries have the same
parameter values and the same technology At, cannot ac-
count for the wide diversity in per-capita output that is ob-
served.What modiﬁcations of the model will break the equal-
output implication of condition (19)? Examination of the
condition suggests three possibilities: (1) keep the same
functional form for production, but consider the possibility
that q or At or both differ across countries; (2) consider
changes to the nature of capital mobility that imply that
rit ¹rjt; and (3) change the functional form for production.
Combinations of these three are, of course, also possibil-
ities.
What about possibility (1), that technology At differs
across countries?
14 Any pattern of per-capita output can,
of course, be explained by a particular assignment of At
across countries and time. If we pursued this possibility,
though, we would be saying that a country is more pro-
ductive because it is more productive. Unless we think
productivity differences are purely due to chance, we need
another approach. In what follows, At is to be interpreted
as the level, or index, of world technology common to all
countries.
What about possibility (2), that rit ¹ rjt because of re-
strictions on the nature of capital mobility? I explore two
such restrictions, each of which implies that capital/labor
ratios need no longer be equal, and ask for each whether
the resulting differences in physical capital per person can
explain development fact 1 (the disparity in wealth across
nations).
One factor that inﬂuences the ﬂow of capital between
countries is government policies. Consider taxes on the
capital rental payments to banks. In this example, and all
the tax examples that follow, assume that the government
uses tax proceeds in a way that has no effect on house-
hold utility or ﬁrm production. Let rit now denote the
rental payment in country i per unit of capital before tax-
es. If a bank rents a unit of capital in country i, it pays a
per-unit tax at country i’s tax rate, denoted ti.
The two necessary conditions imposed by trade are
now iit = ijt and
(20) (1−ti)rit = (1−tj)rjt.
In order to see the last condition, note that the receipts of
a bank that rents capital in country i are [(1−ti)rit + (1−d)]
− (1+it−1). Zero proﬁts on these transactions imply that the
rental rate in country i is
(21) rit = (1−ti)
−1(it−1+d).
Condition (19) can now be written as
(22) rit/rjt = (1−tj)/(1−ti)=[ MPKit(kit)]/[MPKjt(kjt)].
After some algebraic manipulation, this can be expressed
as
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(23) yj/yi = [(1−tj)/(1−ti)]
q/(1−q).
Equation (23) expresses the relative output of two coun-
tries as a function of their tax rates on capital rental pay-
ments. For the typical physical capital shares that are ob-
served, very big differences in tax rates imply small differ-
ences in per-capita output. For example, suppose tj = 1/4
and ti = 3/4. Then, with q = 0.36, per-capita output in the
two countries differs by a factor of 1.86. Take a more ex-
treme example: if tj = 1/10 and ti = 9/10, per-capita out-
put still only differs by a factor of 3.44. Accounting for
observed variations in per-capita output by differences in
per-capita capital stocks caused by differences in govern-
ment policy does not seem like a promising avenue in this
model.
A more extreme assumption about the nature of capital
markets is that all capital is immobile. With this assump-
tion, as Lucas (1990) points out, the difference in the cap-
ital/labor ratio among countries that is needed to explain
the difference in their per-capita output is implausibly
large. Taking India and the United States as an example,
Lucas shows that this difference in capital/labor ratios
implies a marginal product of capital in India about 58
times greater than that in the United States. So, changing
the nature of capital markets does not work either.
While the second possibility does not work, it is sug-
gestive in its failure. Consider equation (23), which ex-
presses relative output as a function of tax rates. Given
any pair of tax rates, the difference in per-capita output
depends critically on the magnitude of q. If the capital
share is bigger, the difference is bigger. This suggests ex-
amining the third option: change the functional form for
production.
Missing Capital
In changing the production function, one must answer the
question, Why is the marginal product of physical capital
not high in countries where that type of capital is scarce?
The answer Lucas (1988) proposes is that other inputs are
also scarce in those countries, inputs complementary to
physical capital. In particular, Lucas considers the possi-
bility that an important capital good is missing from the
Solow technology.
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At this point call the missing good generic capital.
Denote it by G. With this new capital good, the produc-
tion function is now denoted ˜ F(·) and is given by
(24) Yt = ˜ F(Kt,Nt,At,Gt)
which replaces equation (2). Suppose that ˜ F(·) is such that
the marginal productivity of physical capital varies posi-
tively with Gt, that Gt differs across countries, and that
trade does not imply that Gt is equalized across countries
(for reasons discussed below). If these suppositions are
true, then condition (19) need no longer imply that physi-
cal capital per person, or output per person, is the same
across countries.
The law of motion of Gt must also be speciﬁed. De-
note this function by ˜ G; that is,
(25) Gt+1 = ˜ G(Gt,·).
To complete the extension of the Solow model, we
must specify two things: What capital good does Gt rep-
resent? And what form should ˜ F(·) and ˜ G(·) take? An
answer to the ﬁrst question is determined, in part, by what
policies wethinkdevelopingcountriesshouldbepursuing.
Choices about the form of ˜ F(·) and ˜ G(·) are not easy to
make since, as seen below, once we extend the Solow
model, the close connection between model variables and
the NIPA is lost. Ideally, other sources of evidence, such
as panel studies of individuals or ﬁrms, can be used to
make decisions. Another avenue is to explore what the
choices for ˜ F(·) and ˜ G(·) imply about the development
facts. Here I will brieﬂy review how the above questionshave been answered in this literature. In later sections, I
will analyze the models more formally.
Missing Capital as Human Capital
Lucas (1988) takes Gt to be human capital, by which he
means the general skill level of the representative worker.
Since Lucas’ work, much research has been done that as-
sumes the missing capital is human capital (for example,
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992; Jones, Manuelli, and
Rossi, forthcoming). Much of this research focuses on hu-
man capital as years of schooling.
To extend the Solow model in this direction, assume
that labor input is measured in efficiency units and that
increases in human capital increase the efficiency of labor.
Denotehuman capital by h.Then an individualwho works
nt units of time, and has human capital ht, is assumed to
supply lt = ntht units of effective labor.
In considering how to specify the production function
(24) in this case, one restriction that is provided by the
choice of human capital as missing capital is that the in-
puts Nt and Gt = ht do not enter separately since human
capital is embodied in the person. A version of the pro-
duction function Lucas (1988) uses is





With regard to the choice of ˜ G(·), assume that human
capital can be increased by devoting time t goods to its
production. Let xht denote the goods devoted to human
capital accumulation per person; then assume human cap-
ital follows
(27) ht+1 = (1−d)ht + xht
where the rate of depreciation d is chosen to be that of
physical capital.
17 Lucas (1988, p. 19) discusses one possi-
ble motivation for such a technology.
Later, I will derive some of the aggregate implications
of these choices for ˜ F(·) and ˜ G(·). As I will show, they
imply inconsistencies with some of the development facts.
But these inconsistencies alone do not necessarily warrant
considering other candidates for missing capital. That is
becausethechoicesforthefunctionalformsarenotstrong-
ly dictated by any microeconomic evidence from the hu-
mancapitalliterature.Theremaybeotherfunctionalforms
that are just as reasonable.
However, there are reasons to doubt that human cap-
ital, at least when deﬁned as years of schooling, will be
the key factor in understanding differences in per-capita
output. This point has been made by Lucas (1993, pp.
257–58) and others. Here I add a few additional (related)
points in order to motivate looking beyond the choice of
formal education.
Some researchers point to the substantial estimated
returns to education in the United States as supporting evi-
dence for the importance of education in a development
context. (See, for example, Katz 1992.) But there is also
a literature which argues that the returns to education are
high in the United States in those periods and in those
industries where technological change is most rapid (for
example, Welch 1970, Allen 1991). Some argue, for in-
stance, that the growing educational wage premium of the
1980s is attributable in large part to the spread of comput-
er and other technology. If this view is at least partly true,
then since the introduction of technology is not rapid in
many developing countries, one expects the return to edu-
cation is not high either. (See my discussion below of the
work of Schultz.) Perhaps this is why many of the cross-
countryregressionstudiesusingproxiesforeducationhave
found mixed results. (See Benhabib and Spiegel 1992.)
The world also has many historical examples of rapid
growth being introduced into (or eliminated from) regions
in very short periods of time. One example is the recent
rapid growth in regions of China, such as Shanghai. How
can these important episodes be understood in terms of a
theory of development based on accumulation of educa-
tion? To be responsible for such growth, stocks of educa-
tion would have to take very large swings, up and down,
in very short periods of time.
Finally,somecountrieshaveachievedhighlevelsofed-
ucation and literacy, yet have performed poorly, including
the formerly centrally planned economies. (These econo-
mies have about the same level of education as countries
in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment; see Barro 1992, p. 215, n. 1).
These and other concerns have led researchers in two
directions: to extending the concept of human capital to
mean more than years of schooling, which I will discuss
later, and to considering other concepts of missing capital.
Missing Capital as Business Capital
Many policies promoted by the IMF and the World Bank,
such as deregulation, privatization, and stable business en-
vironments, are implicitly based on the assumption that
these policies will create incentives for entrepreneurs to
develop new businesses, adopt new technologies, and the
like. Those investments by entrepreneurs create a type of
capital, capital that exists independently of the entrepre-
neur, capital that I call business capital.
As an example of this type of capital, consider the re-
cent report that the market valuation of Microsoft Corpo-
ration exceeds that of IBM Corporation. Now, presum-
ably, the value of the physical assets owned by IBM great-
ly exceeds that of the physical assets owned by Microsoft.
Yet Microsoft is nonetheless valued higher than IBM be-
cause the stock market currently places a greater value on
the products that Microsoft has developed (that is, its busi-
ness capital) than those of IBM.
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A signiﬁcant aspect of business capital is that it is often
speciﬁc to a region. For example, to introduce a new prod-
uct in an area, an entrepreneur must make adjustments to
suit local tastes; to introduce a new technology, the en-
trepreneur must make the process suitable to local skills.
In their analysis of technological leadership, Nelson and
Wright (1992, p. 1939) argue that “there is nothing ‘sim-
ple’ about the processes through which ﬁrms come to
adopt and learn to control technologies that have been in
use elsewhere for some time.” Concrete examples abound
in agriculture. Innovations such as new fertilizers that are
developed for one region must often undergo signiﬁcant
changes to be of value elsewhere. This aspect of business
capital may play a prominent role in future work.
Parente and Prescott (1991) argue that this type of cap-
ital is scarce in many countries because of lack of incen-
tives to accumulate the capital. In their model, the myriad
of impediments to entrepreneurs are summarized by effec-
tive tax rates that entrepreneurs face.
To extend the Solow model to address such issues,
Parente and Prescott (1991) assume that each householdcan use its time endowment in one of two ways: to man-
age a business, which also entails adopting new technol-
ogy (that is, investing in business capital), or to be em-
ployed by another business (some other entrepreneur).
Households are still assumed to be identical. For sim-
plicity, assume that at time 0 each household decides to
manage a business or to work for another business and
that the choice is irreversible.
19 Since now the number of
individuals differs from the number of businesses, per-
capita and per-business quantities must be distinguished
from each other. Let lowercase letters with carets (or hats)
denote per-business quantities. Denote the business capital
accumulated by an entrepreneur by time t by ˆ bt. The per-
business production function Parente and Prescott (1991)
study is




where (ˆ kt,ˆ nt) are inputs of physical capital and labor and
n ¯ >0 .
20 Before I discuss this function, it will help to intro-
duce the law of motion for ˆ bt.
There is a literature that is relevant for specifying the
law of motion for business capital. It discusses the advan-
tages, in terms of prospective productivity growth, to na-
tions behind the productivity leaders. (See, for example,
Abramovitz 1986.) The literature argues that the further a
country is behind the technology frontier, the easier accu-
mulating business capital is. In symbols, with ˆ bt ﬁxed, the
larger is At (the technology frontier), the greater is the
increase in business capital for a given investment. This
literature also stresses diminishing returns-to-investment,
or adjustment costs, in adopting technology; that is, in-
creases in investment lead to smaller and smaller increases
in business capital. (See, for example, Nelson and Wright
1992.) If ˆ xbt denotes the goods devoted to investment per
ﬁrm in business capital, then Parente and Prescott (1991)
assume that ˆ bt follows





where a >0 .
In specifying models for the two types of capital—
human capital and business capital—it would be nice if
there were technologies that made sense for one but not
the other. This, then, might help distinguish between the
two types of capital. Equation (29) may be a case in point.
There are good reasons for specifying the accumulation
technology for business capital as above. But imagine an
accumulation technology for human capital with the prop-
erty that countries far behind the leader in years of school-
ing can accumulate years of schooling more rapidly than
the leaders. I can’t think of much logical support for such
a speciﬁcation: Why should any country’s ability to accu-
mulate years of schooling be affected by the schooling
levels in other countries?
Now let’s return to a discussion of the production func-
tion. It is helpful to introduce a change of variables. Inte-
grating the law of motion for business capital yields


















t and ˆ xzt = ˆ xbt. With this change, the production
function of the representative ﬁrm becomes









In this form, the degree of homogeneity of the production
function with respect to the factors that can be accumu-
lated, ˆ zt and ˆ kt, depends on the sum of the parameters
1/(1+a) and q. If, as assumed below, these parameters
sum to less than one, then there are decreasing returns in
the factors.
The NIPA alone do not provide a guide to the choices
of q and a. As discussed below, Parente and Prescott
(1991) use another means of identiﬁcation. With the
change of variables, the law of motion for ˆ zt becomes
(32) ˆ xzt = (1+a)
−1[(1+µ)
aˆ zt+1 − ˆ zt].
Later I will derive some of the aggregate implications of
these choices for ˜ F(·) and ˜ G(·).
Formally Adding Human Capital
The Lucas Model...
Now let’s examine more closely these two candidates for
missing capital. Let’s start with human capital and a ver-
sion of a model developed by Lucas (1988).
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Begin with a closed economy. The model consists of
equations (1), (3), (4), (26), and (27) and the initial condi-
tion (K0,h0), where equation (3), the resource constraint,
includes resources used in human capital accumulation.
That is, in per-capita terms,
(33) yt = ct + xkt + xht
= ct +[ k t +1 − (1−d)kt]+[ h t +1 − (1−d)ht]
where xkt is per-capita investment in physical capital.
Lucas also assumes that µ = 0; that is, At = A. The re-
source allocation problem facing this economy is the same
as that in the Solow economy, except that at each time pe-
riod t a decision must be made about the quantity of two
capital goods, kt+1 and ht+1, to carry into the next period.
Market Allocation
Household preferences are the same as in the Solow mod-
el. Assume households own the stock of human capital
and make investments in improving skills. The budget
constraint is
(34) ct + xht + dt = dt−1(1+it−1)+w tl t
where wt is now denominated in time t goods per unit of
effective labor and lt is units of effective labor.
The proﬁt-maximization problem faced by ﬁrms is the
same, too, except that the production function is now giv-
en by equation (26) and lt replaces nt.
Equilibrium
The deﬁnitions of equilibrium need little change. In the
deﬁnition of competitive equilibrium, simply change the
allocation of households so that it includes ht; for the allo-
cation of ﬁrms, change nt to lt.
Necessary conditions for an equilibrium include those
above, that is, conditions (6), (9)–(11), and (13). If house-
holds are maximizing utility, it must also be true that
(35) 1 + it = wt+1 + (1−d).The left side of equation (35) represents the return to in-
vesting in bank deposits; the right side, the return to in-
vesting in skills.
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As with the Solow model, these necessary conditions
can be used to derive properties of the steady-state com-
petitive equilibrium. To do that, ﬁrst substitute it = rt+1 −
d, from (13), into (35), to give rt+1 = wt+1. Then, equating
wt+1 = A(1−q)(kt/ht)
q, from (10), with rt+1 = Aq(kt/ht)
q−1,
from (9), solve for the value of kt/ht in the steady state,
denoted ks/hs:
(36) ks/hs = q/(1−q).
To calculate the productivity growth rate g, equate the
steady-state version of (6), (1+g)




s/b = (1−d)+w t +1.
Substituting wt+1 = A(1−q)(ks/hs)
q into this expression
yields
(38) (1+g)
s/b = (1−d)+A (1−q)(ks/hs)
q.
After the expression for ks/hs is substituted into equation
(38), the growth rate in productivity becomes




...A saTheory of Development
To begin the analysis of the model as a theory of develop-
ment, consider a world composed of many countries with
the same values for parameters, as well as the same tech-
nology, A. Begin with the assumption that each country is
closed from the others. Also, assume that each country is
in a steady state. Hence, in each country, the ratio of
physical to human capital equals kis/his = q/(1−q) and the
growth in productivity is g. Notice that in this world, the
levels of kit and hit can differ across countries, with coun-
tries with larger kit having larger hit as well.
24 The closed
economy, then, is consistent with any degree of diversity
in per-capita output.
Now open the world to trade. That is, starting from this
steady state, assume that both physical capital and depos-
its are free to move across borders, but households are
not. We can easily show that there will be no trade in this
world, so that the differences in per-capita output will per-
sist. To demonstrate this, I now show that all of the neces-
sary conditions implied by trade are satisﬁed in the closed
economy.
There are two conditions that must be checked. First,
from arguments above, the world will have a single inter-
est rate it and a single rental rate rt. Hence, forming the
ratio of (9) for two countries produces
(40) rit/rjt = rt/rt =1=MPKit/MPKjt
=[ q A ( k it/hit)
q−1]/[qA(kjt/hjt)
q−1].
In a world of trade, kjt and hjt must be such that equation
(40) is satisﬁed. Equation (40) is, of course, satisﬁed by
quantities from the closed economy since kis/his is the
same across countries. Hence, there is no incentive to
move physical capital.
Second, how about human capital? While, by assump-
tion, households are not mobile across borders, the fact
that a market in deposits exists means that individuals can
invest in banks that can invest in human capital in other
countries. Hence, the returns to human capital will be
equalized.
25 That is, with a common interest rate, from
(35), there will be a common wage wt = wit for all i.
Forming the ratio of (10) for two countries thus produces




Equalization of wage rates is also satisﬁed by quantities
from the closed economy. The conclusion is that even in
the presence of trade, the level of per-capita output across
countries can be very different.
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While this model presents new possibilities, the partic-
ular functional forms yield implications that seem to be
inconsistent with development fact 2 (a roughly constant
range of relative wealth). For example, suppose the coun-
tries of the model differ in small ways, say, in the parame-
ters d or s or in the technology constant A. Then, in a
steady state of a closed world, each country has kis/his =
q/(1−q), and each grows at a different rate gi [that is, yit =
yis(1+gi)
t]. As before, if trade were introduced, there would
be no incentive for movement of capital. Each country
would continue on its steady-state path. In such a world,
the ratio ykt/yit would either converge to zero or increase
without bound, which is apparently at odds with fact 2.
(See also the discussion in Lucas 1993.)
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Note that the fact that the production function has con-
stant returns-to-scale in the factors that can be accumu-
lated does not necessarily imply the inconsistency with
fact 2. Lucas (1993) sketches a model with such a produc-
tion function but in which the human capital of the lead-
ing nation (or the average of all nations) is an argument
of each country’s accumulation technology. This change
insures that outputs do not spread out through time. But
as discussed above, that does not seem to be a reasonable
way to specify an accumulation technology for education
(not that Lucas seriously offers it as one). However, note
that the linearity of the production function has troubling
aspects on its own.
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Other Models
These considerations suggest that other models of human
capital be explored. Let’s examine two.
Some of the earliest work on human capital was actual-
ly done in the context of developing countries, by Schultz
(1975, 1980). His theories, however, have not been used
in the new literature on economic development (though
they have been examined to some extent in related areas,
in Holmes and Schmitz 1990, 1993). From his study of
farm people in developing countries, Schultz (1975) con-
cludes that a key function of human capital is to improve
the ability of farmers to reallocate their work effort and
resources in response to changes in their economic envi-
ronments (such as when new fertilizers and farming tech-
niques become available).
In making this point, Schultz distinguishes between tra-
ditional and modern farming economies. In traditional
economies, the farm environment changes very little. In
these settings, Schultz (1975, pp. 831–32) says, “farm
people know from long experience what their own effort
can get out of the land and equipment.” In such econo-mies, “there is, for all practical purposes, no premium for
the human ability to deal with secular economic changes.”
However, in modern economies, Schultz says, farmers
must “deal with a sequence of changes in economic con-
ditions [such as the availability of new fertilizers], which
are in general not of their own making because they origi-
nate mainly out of the activities of people other than farm
people.”
Schultz (1975, 1980) argues that the value of education
is high in environments where signiﬁcant changes, such
as new technology adoption, are occurring. In some coun-
tries, these changes are not occurring (for whatever rea-
son); hence, there the value of education is limited.
29 The
work of Schultz suggests that the link between economic
development and human capital is more complex than is
typically imagined in existing models.
Lucas (1993) extends the notion of human capital as
well. In this work, human capital is capital that can be ac-
cumulated “in schools, in research organizations, and in
the course of producing goods and engaging in trade”
(Lucas 1993, p. 270). He sketches theories of human capi-
tal accumulation based on learning while producing goods
(following Stokey 1988, 1991 and Young 1991). Lucas
presents evidence—data based on production of Liberty
Ships (cargo ships used during WWII)—that such learn-
ing-by-doing can be quantitatively signiﬁcant. But as
Lucas (1993, p. 262) admits, “There is also considerable
ambiguity about what this evidence means.” Is the capital
accumulated in the Liberty Ship example best described
as human capital?
Similarly, recall the Microsoft example. The products
that Microsoft has developed—the code for its programs
—is not very well described as either physical capital or
human capital. Perhaps models of economic development
need to include another concept.
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Formally Adding Business Capital
The Parente and Prescott Model...
Again,ParenteandPrescott(1991)havedevelopedamod-
el that includes the concept of business capital. Here I
will describe a version of their model.
Begin with a closed economy. The model consists, es-
sentially, of equations (1), (3), (4), (31), and (32) and the
initial conditions for physical capital and business capital
[and where the resource constraint (3) is understood to
include resources used in business capital accumulation].
I say essentially because equations (31) and (32) are ex-
pressedinper-businessform.InParenteandPrescott1991,
these equations are expressed in total and per-capita form.
Market Allocation
In this model, households again have the preferences giv-
en in equation (1). Households are distinguished by their
occupational choice; some work as employees, some as
entrepreneurs. Households that work as employees have
budget constraints identical to those in the Solow model.
Households that are entrepreneurs manage their ﬁrms and
invest in business capital. In order to keep the analysis
similar to the above models, assume that entrepreneurs
rentbusiness capital totheir ﬁrmsand that their compensa-
tion from being an entrepreneur comes entirely from these
rental payments. Imagine that these entrepreneurs rent ˆ zt
to ﬁrms for a payment qt per unit of capital.
31 A fraction
y of this payment is due as taxes.
32 The budget constraint
for such a household is
(42) ct + ˆ xzt + dt = dt−1(1+it−1) + (1−y)qtˆ zt.
The decision problems faced by ﬁrms and banks are
essentially the same as those in the Solow model. In par-
ticular, assume that ﬁrms continue to rent physical capital
from banks and labor input from households (those that
are employees). Firms also rent business capital from
households(thosethatareentrepreneurs).Ifﬁrmsaremax-
imizing proﬁt, it must be that
(43) qt = MPZt(ˆ kt,ˆ zt,ˆ nt)
where MPZt is the derivative of the production function in
(31) with respect to ˆ zt. The tax paid by banks per unit of
capital rental receipts is t.
Equilibrium
The deﬁnition of competitive equilibrium in the Solow
model needs little change. However, a condition must be
added that each household is indifferent to changing occu-
pations.
While only minor changes are needed in the deﬁnition,
a major question arises about the existence of an equilibri-
um. That is, there may not be a solution to the ﬁrms’
maximization problem since the production function (31)
may exhibit increasing returns-to-scale. Hence, assume
that a > q/(1−q). With this assumption, the production
function (31) displays increasing returns-to-scale in the in-
puts ˆ zt,ˆ kt, and ˆ nt for ˆ nt < n ¯ and decreasing returns for ˆ nt
> n ¯.From this assumption, each ﬁrm that operates does so
at ˆ nt = n ¯.
Necessary conditions for an equilibrium include those
for the Solow model, that is, conditions (6), (9)–(11), and
(13), as well as (43). It must also be true that





The left side here represents the return to investing in bank
deposits; the right side, the return to investing in business
capital. Households that are entrepreneurs have these two
investment options open to them.
As before, the necessary conditions can be used to de-
rive the rate of productivity growth g in the steady state.
First, substitute it = rt+1 − d, from (13), into (44). This pro-
vides an equation in rt+1 and qt+1. Then substitute rt+1 =
MPKt+1 = q(y ˆt+1/ˆ kt+1) and qt+1 = MPZt+1 = (1+a)
−1(y ˆt+1/ˆ zt+1)
into this equation. Clearly, ˆ kt+1 and ˆ zt+1 must grow at the
same rate in a steady state. One can argue from this equa-
tion that y ˆt+1 must also grow at that rate. Substituting y ˆt =
y ˆs(1+g)
t,ˆ z t=ˆ z s (1+g)
t, and ˆ kt = ˆ ks(1+g)
t into (31) and rear-
ranging gives
(45) g = (1+µ)
a/[a−q(1+a)] −1 .
...A saTheory of Development
In order to assess this model as a theory of development,
values for key parameters must be chosen. As will be
seen, the share of physical capital q and the curvature pa-
rameter in the law of motion for business capital a are
two parameters which determine some of the key quanti-
tative properties of the model. [They enter (55) below,
which is the analog of (23).] Both of these parameters
enter equation (45), which shows that the rate of produc-
tivity growth g depends on them (q and a) as well as on
the rate of world technology growth µ. As before, parame-ters are chosen so that productivity growth is consistent
with the long-run annual average of about 2 percent (g =
0.02). The parameter q is derived from the NIPA. Given
q, there are, of course, any number of pairs (a,µ) that
imply a productivity growth rate g = 0.02. Hence, another
condition is needed to identify the relative importance of
world technology and business capital accumulation in
determining productivity growth. Parente and Prescott
(1991) use the post-WWII experience of Japan and the
United States for this purpose; they choose the parameter
a so that the model can produce the large moves in the
relative wealth distribution that have been observed, mak-
ing the model consistent with development fact 3.
To sketch their approach for choosing a, assume that
the U.S. economy is in steady state in 1950, with produc-
tivity growing 2 percent per year. The Japanese economy
of 1950 is assumed to be the same as that of the United
States, including its tax rates, except that the Japanese
economy is not in steady state. Given the same tax rates,
the Japanese per-capita output level converges in the mod-
el to the U.S. level. The amount of time it takes to con-
verge depends on the nature of capital mobility and, as
discussed below, the pair (a,µ). In this exercise, assume
that there is no capital mobility. Choose the pair (a,µ)so
that the convergence in the model resembles the actual ex-
perience of Japan. The actual record is that Japan’s per-
capita output was about 1/6 that of the United States in
1950; that fraction had grown to 3/4 by 1985. The param-
eter values that yield g = 0.02 and a path for Japanese out-
put that matches the record are a = 1.155 and µ = 0.012.
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Now turn to the other development facts. Consider a
world composed of many countries with the same values
for parameters but with different tax rates ti and yi. Begin
with the assumption that markets in both physical capital
and deposits are worldwide. In a world with trade, where
countries have different tax rates on capital, the level of
per-capita output will differ across countries. As I show
below, the range of output is much greater here than in
the Solow model.
Two necessary conditions imposed by trade are iit = ijt
and (1−ti)rit = (1−tj)rjt. There are many reasons to assume
business capital is less mobile than physical capital. Here
I assume business capital is immobile. Still, the existence
of a market in deposits means that individuals can invest
in banks that can invest in business capital in other coun-
tries. With a common interest rate, (44) implies that
(1−yi)qit = (1−yj)qjt. Forming the ratio of (9), and then
(43), for two countries gives
(46) rit/rjt = (1−tj)/(1−ti)=MPKit/MPKjt
(47) qit/qjt = (1−yj)/(1−yi)=MPZit/MPZjt.
These conditions can be used to express the ratio of
per-capita output as a function of tax rates. Dropping hats
for the moment,use theper-business productionfunction
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to express kit as a function of yit and zit; namely,
(49) kit =[ y it/ait]
1/q
where




Substitute this expression into the MPKit function. Then
marginal products can be related to per-capita output;
namely,
(51) MPKit = qait(yit/ait)
(q−1)/q.









(53) MPZit = (1+a)
−1(yit/zit)
condition (47) can be used to arrive at the expression
(54) zjt/zit = [(1−yj)/(1−yi)](yjt/yit).
Using this in the expression for MPKit/MPKjt and evaluat-
ing (46) yields




which is the analog of equation (23) in the Solow model.
Let ti = yi, so that tax rates are the same within a
country. Consider initially the same range of tax rates as
in the Solow model. Given q = 0.217 and a = 1.155, tax
rates of tj = 1/4 and ti = 3/4 imply that per-capita output
differs in this world by a factor of 10.5, as compared to
1.86 in the Solow model.
35 In the more extreme example,
with tj = 1/10 and ti = 9/10, per-capita output differs by
a factor of 110, as compared to 3.44 before. These are
certainly much bigger differences than calculated for the
Solow model. However, suppose that tj represents the tax
rate in a developed country, so that tj = 1/2 is not un-
reasonably high. Then if ti represents the tax rate in a
less-developed country, ti = 9/10 is needed to make per-
capita output differ by a factor of about 30. This tax rate
of 9/10 that is needed to explain development fact 1 may
be too big to be believed. In any case, much more work
is needed to actually measure tax rates on entrepreneurs in
developing countries.
Conclusion
The neoclassical theory of economic growth, that relies on
differences in physical capital per person across countries
to explain the wide disparity in per-capita output, cannot
explain the observed inequality in the world. Neither, it
seems, canthenewtheoriesofeconomicdevelopmentthat
stress differences in human capital, or education, across
countries. However, theories that stress differences across
countries in the incentives provided to entrepreneurs to
adopt new technology and create businesses may have
focused on a key aspect of the development process. Still,
questions remain about such things as how to measure ef-
fective tax rates on entrepreneurs.
The high tax rates on entrepreneurs assumed to prevail
in poor economies are a summary of the many barriers to
such efforts as adopting new technology and creating new
businesses. These barriers are obviously created by groups
in society, those with vested interests in the status quo.
(See Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986, Mokyr 1990.) Econo-
mists are only beginning to understand the forces that lead
to such barriers. (See Krusell and Rios-Rull 1992.) Onceprogress is made on that subject, we will be better able to
offer good policy advice on things like how to design
institutions which minimize resistance to the adoption of
technology.
*The author is also a research associate at the Center for Economic Studies at the
U.S. Census Bureau. For comments on earlier drafts, the author thanks Fernando
Alvarez, Steve Cassou, V. V. Chari, Per Krusell, Ellen McGrattan, B. Ravikumar, and
Richard Rogerson. The author especially thanks Ed Green and Ed Prescott.
1I use the term wealth of nations synonymously with the term productivity of
nations (as do Parente and Prescott, in this issue).
2Quah (1990) analyzes the raw Summers and Heston (1991) data set.
3More formally, these studies typically examine the conditional mean or condi-
tional growth rate of the wealth of nations.
4Note that the discussion here borrows much from Lucas 1988, 1990.
5The model is actually the ﬁrst of two models that Lucas 1988 develops. Many
versions of the model have appeared since.
6Note that this failure of this particular speciﬁcation does not alone necessarily
warrant abandoning human capital. Thatis because the choices forthe functional forms
arenotstronglydictatedbyany microeconomicevidencefromthehumancapitallitera-
ture. There may be other functional forms that are just as reasonable. More on this
below.
7The exercise may be a bit tedious for some readers, but is included to make the
paper’s arguments accessible to as wide an audience as possible.
8The assumptions on the production function F insure that ﬁrms earn zero proﬁts
each period. Assumptions below insure that banks do too. Also, an equilibrium condi-
tion will be that banks have zero net worth. Hence, ﬁrm and bank proﬁt, and bank net
worth, can be dropped from the budget constraint.
9To see this algebraically, express the budget constraint, equation (5), as ct =
dt−1(1+it−1)+w tn t−d t,and substitute this for ct in the objective function, equation (1).
Then differentiating the objective function with respect to dt and rearranging yields (6).
10Note that since the number of households and the number of ﬁrms are the same,
I use the symbol nt to denote both labor supply and labor demand.
11I use nt = 1 in equation (15) because this is a necessary condition for equi-
librium.
12If banks in country i and j both had deposits, yet banks in one country paid a
lower interest rate, then consumers with deposits in banks with a lower interest rate
could not be maximizing utility.
13For example, suppose that Kit >0 ,K jt > 0, and rit >rjt. Then for banks to earn
zero proﬁts on rentals in country j, it must be that rjt = it−1 + d, where it−1 is the com-
mon interest rate. But then banks would earn positive returns on rentals in country i,
which is inconsistent with a competitive equilibrium.
14The other possibility, that q differs across countries in a way that can explain
some of the facts, has been discussed by Lucas (1988, p. 14).
15The per-capita production function can be used to express kit as a function of
yit; namely, kit =( y it/At)
1/q. Substitute this expression into the MPKit function; then
marginalproductscanberelatedtoper-capita output: MPKit=qAt(yit/At)
(q−1)/q.Finally,
substituting this expression for MPKitin equation (22) and rearranging gives the result.
16Another way to change the production function is to assume physical capital has
external effects. Romer (1986) considers this type of change, and Benhabib and
Jovanovic (1991) evaluate it.
17Both the production technology and the law of motion for human capital are
somewhat different than those Lucas (1988) uses. This speciﬁcation, and many more
general ones, are studied in Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi, forthcoming.
18Of course, the market is also valuing, to some extent, the prospects for future
product development, which depend to some degree on the market’s evaluation of how
long Microsoft’s chair and co-founder, Bill Gates, will remain at the company. Also,
IBM presumably has greater unmeasured liabilities (for example, commitments to em-
ployees).
19This is done for convenience; see Parente and Prescott 1991 for a more general
analysis.
20The production technology is motivated by Lucas 1978. For a given level of
business capital, there are ultimately diminishing returns to increasing physical capital
and labor since n ¯ is a ﬁnite number. The source of these diminishing returns is assumed
to be the loss of control by managers who have limited span of control.
21For an analysis of this model and more general formulations of it, see Jones,
Manuelli, and Rossi, forthcoming.
22Note that the return to investing in skills equals the value of an additional unit
of effective skill, which consists of the wage on that unit, plus the value of the unde-
preciated skill after use.
23Note that the same arguments that led to the steady-state version of (6) in the
Solow model apply here. That is, in a steady state, since the ratio of physical to human
capital is constant, kt and ht grow at the same rate, say, g. Hence, yt grows at this rate
as well. To verify that ct = cs(1+g)
t, examine equation (3).
24Such differences can arise because of differences in initial conditions.
25There may be reasons, of course, why such markets do not operate. Here, ﬁnally,
is a potential reason for pursuing policy regarding education. (See below as well.)
26Note that in the economy with trade, the wage paid to someone of skill level ht
in country i is htMPLit. Since MPLit does not vary across countries, the wage paid to
skill level ht does not either. However, migration from poorer to richer countries is
typically at the maximal permitted rate, and the pressure for further migration seems






at, where hat represents the average human capital in the country and
x > 0. In this formulation, the marginal product of a worker is inﬂuenced by the skill
of co-workers. In such a formulation, policy may have a role.
27It is interesting to note that if the tax example presented for the Solow model is
repeated, then the two necessary conditions (40) and (41) implied by trade cannot both
be satisﬁed.
28As an example, consider a one-capital-good model with constant returns, the AK
model. In this model, the production technology is Y = AK. In a world without external
effects, the parameter A plays two roles. Note ﬁrst that A is the marginal product of
capital; hence, MPK = A = r = i + d, which implies that A @ 0.14. But A is also the
inverse of the capital/output ratio; hence, A = Y/K,which implies that A @ 0.33 (if K/Y
@ 3). These numbers differ by a factor greater than 2.
29The reason individuals may be educated in such economies is that education is
typically a subsidized investment.
30Another model of human capital is that of Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-i-Martin
(1992). They are motivated by the work of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), who have
run regressions of the growth of per-capita output on initial per-capita output and other
variables. (They argue that countries have different steady states and that these other
variables are used as proxies for the steady states.) Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-i-Martin
focus on explaining the estimated coefficient on initial per-capita output; they do not
address the determinants of the different steady states (that is, disparity).
31A zero-proﬁt condition for ﬁrms in the deﬁnition of equilibrium will insure that
these payments to entrepreneurs exhaust proﬁts of ﬁrms.
32Since Parente and Prescott (1991) emphasize the importance of the incentive
effects of tax rates, they calibrate their model under the assumption of particular values
for tax rates. Hence, I introduce taxes in this section. Also, as above, assume taxes are
used in a way that has no effect on household utility or ﬁrm production.
33Consider how the choice (a,µ) inﬂuences the path to the steady state. Suppose
a were arbitrarily large. Productivity growth would then be a function of world tech-
nology alone. The model would behave the same way as the Solow model. As is well
known, the Solow model implies a much faster Japanese convergence toward the
United States than actually happened. (See, for example, Christiano 1989.) If a were
ﬁnite, then business capital would play a role in productivity growth. The smaller is
a, the smaller is µ, and the larger is the role of business capital in productivity growth.
The smaller is a, the more protracted is the path to the steady state.
34Note that I am using the per-business production function to discuss differences
in per-capita output. This is not a problem since the conversion factor is the same for
all countries.
35Note that from the NIPA Parente and Prescott (1991) calculate q to be 0.217.
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